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Abstract
The Kingdom o f  Lesotho is at the Crossroads. Since the form ation  
o f  the Union o f  South Africa in 1910 up to date there has been 
debate with regard to (lack of) necessity fo r  Lesotho to become 
integrated with South Africa in order fo r  Lesotho to have viability 
and sustainability. While the issue o f  integration seemed offensive 
during the apartheid rule in South Africa, democratization in 1994 
has provided hope that integration is worthy o f  consideration and 
national dialogue in Lesotho. This paper uses desk-top 
methodology’ to address the debate on integration and/or 
incorporation o f  Lesotho and South Africa and concludes by 
pointing out that this debate is impeded from being conclusive 
because o f  its exclusive nature by fa iling  to subject the issue to a 
national referendum.
The paper is divided into fo u r  sections. Section one provides the 
background. Section two is the historical overview o f  the debate. 
Section three is the debate on the advantages and disadvantages o f  
Lesotho's incorporation/integration with South Africa. While fo u r  
is the conclusion.
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1. Background
Democratisation in South Africa in 1994 has hitherto brought 
about many a problem for the tiny Kingdom o f Lesotho. While 
during the apartheid regime, Lesotho used to enjoy a special place 
in the United Nations Organisation and the international 
community at large as the fragile state desperate for survival and 
protection o f its unitary state sovereignty "whithin the belly" o f its 
more powerful police state o f the Republic o f South Africa; after 
1994, this special treatment has waned and Lesotho largely has to 
make it (alone?) somehow. Many development agencies such as 
the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
United States Information Services (USIS), for example, have 
closed down their offices in Maseru, the capital o f  Lesotho, and 
moved to South Africa. The United Nations High Comm ission for 
Refugees closed down years ago and migrated to South Africa as 
well. The United Nations Development Programme has chopped 
down its support to Lesotho tremendously too (M ashinini and De 
Villiers, 2001).
1.1 Negative Scenario
On its part, democratic South Africa has added salt to wound. 
First, shortly after the coming into power o f the African National 
Congress (ANC) led government in April 1994, Lesotho 
experienced a palace coup in August, 1994. The then King o f 
Lesotho Letsie III, uniletarally declared the Basutoland Congress 
Party (BCP) government dissolved and replaced it with his own 
self-appointed government, called Provisional Council o f State 
composed o f six people - what was generally referred to as the 
"Six Pack" government in public circles in Lesotho. Much has 
been written about this political crisis in Lesotho (See Matlosa, 
1994; Sekatle 1994; Southall & Petlane, 1995). During this crisis, 
the South African Defence Force, (SADF) made several military 
air acrobatics into Lesotho along the border and over Maseru.
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Complaint sent to the government o f South Africa by Lesotho 
about these acts was met with mockery that the boys were just 
doing some military exercises. O f course, these acts by the SADF 
constituted violation o f Lesotho's sovereignty over its air space.
Second, in January, 1995, the now late King M oshoeshoe II 
was returned to the throne. Much debate and controversies took 
place over the constitutionality o f the rethronment. These 
controversies climaxed with one Mosotho man, who happened to 
be a lawyer and the then President o f the Law society o f Lesotho, 
launching a legal case against the government o f Lesotho for 
having rethroned King Moshoeshoe II unconstitutionally. This 
case dragged for a long time and threatened to spark o ff instability 
in Lesotho. Again South Africa came into Lesotho and unilaterally 
took the said man to Pretoria for official reprimand (Mirror, 1995 
a). Through this act, again democratic South Africa undermined 
the sovereignty o f  Lesotho and the power o f the then BCP-led 
government in that it was by-passed in this matter.
Third, in April, 1995, the government o f South Africa struck an 
agreement with the National Union o f Mineworkers (NUM), a 
South African Trade Union, to grant some SADC migrants 
including Basotho mineworkers and those employed in other 
sectors o f South Africa economy, over the past five (5) years 
starting from 1995 backwards, the status o f permanent residents 
and that o f full citizenship after a period o f 5 years had been served 
as permanent resident by one. No negotiations were held with the 
government o f Lesotho on this South Africa - NUM  hatched 
scheme. Much debate existed about this act by the South African 
government and its potential impact on Lesotho's economy (see 
Matlosa, 1996; Gill, 1996; Weisfelder, 1997). Again, Lesotho's 
sovereignty was tarnished and so was the face o f  the government 
o f Lesotho by South Africa's behaviour not using bilateral official 
channels to discuss this very important issue.
Fourth, South Africa has been working on the scheme to have 
the present borders removed. Government o f Lesotho is not in 
favour o f the idea. However, South Africa has had its own 
commission looking into this matter and the proposed scenario is
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that the border gates on the South Africa side be left open, so that, 
people can pass.
Fifth, after dem ocratisation, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) countries openly recognized, in line with the 
rest o f the world community, free education for all in South Africa. 
Some o f these governments began to actively encourage and give 
financial support to students in their countries to go to South 
Africa for specialised and higher education not available at home. 
Paterson and Rouhani (1996) provide a useful statistical evidence 
o f the magnitude o f  this phenomenon which they call "foreign 
students at South African Universities" and the implications it has 
for South Africa. One o f the biggest complaints by South Africa 
was that it (South Africa) is at present not changing special rates 
on fees to foreign students and therefore directly subsidises their 
education in South Africa - a situation which is deemed 
unaffordable at present, given budget cuts by government to 
tertiary education. The SADC countries were therefore asked by 
South Africa to discuss a Draft Protocol on Education and Training 
for SADC that would facilitate member states to share 
accountability on tertiary education provision for SADC not later 
than June, 1997. This protocol was ratified by SADC member 
states in 2000. Lesotho features high in the list (fourth) o f 
countries sending students to South Africa for specialized and 
higher education - an average o f 155 in 1992. Since 1994 when 
democratisation took place this number has gone higher and stood 
at more than 10,000 in 2000 South Africa's insistance that it charge 
an 'enhanced' rate o f fees to foreign students, affected Lesotho 
negatively because the per capita cost to higher education 
increased. Average per capita costs for Lesotho students stood at 
about M l0,000 and R20,000 for undergraduate and postgraduate 
students respectively in 1998 (Mashinini and M ashinini, 2003).
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1.2 Positive Scenario
Not all acts committed by South Africa have been negative to 
Lesotho. Indeed, there have been many politically and 
economically highly significant endeavours which the former has 
done to salvage Lesotho's seemingly endless stream of crises.
First, South Africa together with Botswana and Zimbabwe played 
a leading role in the restoration o f the democratically elected BCP 
government in Lesotho when it was outsed by King Letsie III in 
August, 1994. This contribution by South Africa, inter alia, 
insured the return o f social stability which had particularly been 
shaken as the Lesotho Defence Force massacred five (5) innocent 
Basotho civilians in a demonstration to the palace against the 
Palace Coup. South Africa is, in fact, one o f the three "quarantor 
states" to Lesotho's stability since then to date (Matlosa, 1994).
Second, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe played a key 
role to ensure that King Moshoeshoe II was rethroned on 25th 
January, 1995 (W esfelder, 1997). As Mirror (1995 b :l)  put it " a 
tug o f war is finally over between the Royal Family and the 
government after the pressure the three presidents o f the 
neighbouring states have forced on the government to reinstate the 
king."
Third, in January, 1994, the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) 
made a mutiny against the government in demand for a pay rise of 
100%. Failure to resolve this issue timeously on the part o f  the 
government o f Lesotho, led to a worsening o f crisis to a point 
where the LDF got divided between those in favour o f continued 
strike action, namely, those based at the Makoanyane barracks vis- 
a-vis those who wanted a return to work, namely, those based at 
the Ramatjomose barracks. This disagreement became so serious 
that the two platoons took to the tops o f the hills adjacent to their 
respective barracks and launched mortar attacks at each other. 
Much damage to both lives and property was incurred. Matlosa 
(1994:226) estimates that five (5) lives were lost and 11 people 
injured. It took the intervention o f the three "guarantor states" of 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa, the Commonwealth
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Secretariat, the Organisation o f Africa Unity (OAU), United 
Nations Development Programme, (UNDP) and the Donor 
Community to get a resettlement between these military factions 
and government (W eisfelder, 1997). Again, South Africa's 
contribution was magnanimous. The Citizen N ewspaper o f 
Johannesburg, W ednesday, 19 January (1994:2) captured 
commitment o f South Africa to Lesotho then as follows:
The South A frica government regarded the Lesotho 
government as a legitimate and democratically elected  
government and any attempt to unseat it through force o f  
arms would he unacceptable.
Fourth, in January, 1996, the then King M oshoeshoe II met a fatal 
car accident which claimed his life. South Africa played a crucial 
role in assisting with the flight logistics to air lift both the body o f 
his late Majesty, royal family and dignitaries present to the top o f 
Thaba-Bosiu for final burial and on assisting in general traffic 
control and management o f the multitudes o f people and vehicular 
traffic present.
Fifth, in winter, 1996, Lesotho experienced what was regarded 
as the worst snowfall o f all time. The entire country's lowlands 
and mountains were enmeshed in snow o f more than one metre 
high and the highlands were cut-off from the rest o f the country for 
weeks on end. South Africa provided the air services to assist the 
Lesotho Defence Force to search for missing people, fly those in 
need to hospital in the lowlands and send food and other basic 
necessities to key emergency relief points in the mountains o f 
Lesotho.
Sixth, in February, 1997, the police made a mutiny in solidarity 
with eight o f their (senior?) colleagues who had been asked to 
appear in court against a charge o f murder o f their (senior?) 
colleagues in 1995 over a dispute on participation o f  the latter 
police in disciplinary measures taken against the strike action by 
the Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (LTTU) in that same year o f 
1995 on a request for improved salaries and terms o f service by
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government o f Lesotho. Peaceful measures by the government of 
Lesotho and other people o f goodwill such as the opposition 
parties and the churches, for instance, failed to convince neither the 
concerned police officers to obey the law and appear in court nor 
their supporting police colleagues to stop the mutiny (W eisfelder 
1997) Tension prevailed in the country especially in Maseru for 
two weeks (W eisfelder, 1997). Eventually the government of 
Lesotho announced on Wednesday, February, 12th, 1997, that the 
Lesotho Defence Force had been mandated to deal with the matter 
o f the police mutiny accordingly. On Tursday, 13th February, 
1997, the emissary o f the three quarantor states o f South Africa, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe arrived in Lesotho from Cape Town, 
South Africa, bearing a message o f concern by the three countries 
that the government handle the matter o f the policy mutiny with 
care; lest intervention by the military result in bloodshed.
Despite denials by the deputy Prime Minister o f Lesotho on 
Radio Lesotho and BBC that Lesotho had sought assistance from 
South Africa, in an interview over channel 2 o f South Africa 
Television on Monday 17th February, 1997, the Director General 
o f Foreign Affairs o f South Africa, indicated that Lesotho had 
indeed approached his government to assist the military quell 
trouble should the police mutiny prove beyond its control - a 
matter which, he conceded, his government watched with a close 
interest until the Lesotho military managed to resolve it through a 
storm operation code named "KISSWING" on Sunday, 16th 
February, 1997.
Seventh, on Monday the 9th June, 1997, Dr. Ntsu Mokhehle, the 
then Leader o f the BCP and Prime Minister, called a press 
conference in which he announced, first, his resignation from the 
BCP; second, that he had formed a new political party on Saturday, 
7th June, 1997, called the Lesotho Congress for Democracy 
(LCD); and surprisingly, that he and those with whom they have 
formed LCD in parliament were 40 and constituted a majority in 
parliament; therefore, according to the constitution, that 
automatically entitled him not only to remain the Prime Minister 
o f Lesotho, but, to transfer the BCP government to his side so that
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it became the LCD that governed legitimately (Southal and Fox, 
1999; Matlosa, 1997).
This declaration by Dr. Ntsu M okhehle was widely condemned 
by the BCP, leaders o f various parties in Lesotho, the international 
community and indeed the nation at large, save, those who had 
loyalty to N tsu M okhehle (Matlosa, 1997). In reality M okhehle's 
act amounted to theft o f BCP government in a more subtle manner, 
but that which was reminiscent o f the way the BNP stole the BCP 
government in 1970 (Khaketla, 1971). M okhehle made a 
"constitutional coup" against the BCP government and ruled 
through the LCD until the general election o f 1998. The election 
outcome which favored the LCD was disputed by other parties and 
resulted in violence and damage to property worth two billion 
Maloti and loss o f many lives (Southal and Fox, 1999; M ashinini 
and De Villiers, 2001). Again the SADC intervention through 
South Africa and Botswana military forces intervened at high cost 
to restore stability in Lesotho (Southal and Fox, 1999; LSSJ; 
1999). Until today, the SADC ministers for foreign affairs, headed 
by the South African foreign Minister, have since 1998 been 
engaged in a tireless effort to assist the Interim Political Authority 
(IPA) to prepare for the re-election envisaged for sometime in 
2002.
The unfolding scenarios charted above in relation to the post­
apartheid South Africa-Lesotho relations since 1994 has, more 
than ever before, convinced some politicians, students o f 
international relations; those o f Political Geography, and those o f 
Southern African Studies, and indeed interested observers from the 
public milieu, that the future o f Lesotho lies nowhere else than in 
forging an integration with post-apartheid South Africa. The lead 
in thinking about Lesotho's future after apartheid was taken by the 
National University o f Lesotho, through the Institute o f  Southern 
African Studies (ISAS) and the Department o f  Political and 
Administrative Studies which organised a series o f seminars and 
conferences since the late 1980’s into the early 1990’s. These 
conferences were largely, but not exclusively, supported from the 
Swedish Government financially and resulted in an im portant book
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publication by Sejanamane & Santho (1991). Other important 
contributions to this debate have been advanced by Sethala (1990); 
Mahao (1991); Southall (1991); Molise and Muller (1991); Lemon 
(1996); Love (1995; LUTARU, 1996).
2. Lesotho's incorporation into South Africa: a historical 
overview
The idea that Lesotho's future lies in its incorporation into its 
bigger, more economically and politically powerful neighbour, 
South Africa, is not new. Commenting on this issue of 
incorportation, the editorial o f Sethala (1990:19) observed that:
M any people today are debating whether Lesotho should 
be incorporated into a free South Africa. This is not the 
first time in our history that such a question has been 
posed.
The editor went on to reproduce an article in Mochochonono 
newspaper o f 1934 that discusses the issue o f whether the then 
Basutoland ought to be incorporated into the then Union o f South 
Africa. This discussion was a rejoinder to an earlier proposal 
hetched between the Boers and the British that Lesotho become 
part o f the Union o f South Africa in 1910; which idea Basotho 
rejected. Discussions on the history o f and ideas behind the 
thought that Lesotho be incorporated into South Africa abound 
(see Marquard, 1971; Stevens, 1972; Eloff, 1979; Lemon, 1996 
among others). Commenting on the issue o f incorporation, Eloff 
(1979:37-39), writes that:
After 1910 the Orange Free State became part o f  the Union 
o f  South A frica and the border and land issue, Basutoland, 
was henceforth to be the responsibility o f  the central 
government. As early as 1913 the South A frican  
government had asked Britain to incorporate the 
three British protectorates (Basutoland, Bechuanaland
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and Swaziland) into the Union: The reason fo r  this was 
mainly that the existence o f  future independent non-white 
states within the geographical unit o f  South Africa  
would constitute a contradiction.
It might be noted that the history o f co-existence between these 
two countries since 1910 to date has been that o f dichotomous 
parallel thinking on this issue. On its part South Africa o f  the past- 
apartheid years and that o f today's democratic era has continued to 
display an attitude o f treating Lesotho like any o f its part at its 
convenience while the latter has relentlessly struggled to maintain 
its unitary sovereignity while at the same time continuing to be 
dependent on South Africa.
3. The debate
Contemporary day discussions on the future o f Lesotho invariably 
crystallise on two major options, namely the maintenance o f  a 
unitary state sovereignty by Lesotho and attempts to enhance its 
development through negotiations with South Africa for closer 
regional economic arrangements vis-a-vis the option that Lesotho 
forgo its unitary state sovereignty and negotiate for total 
integration into South Africa to become its tenth province or part 
o f the Free State Province.
In this debate there is the antagonistic viewpoint composed o f 
those who reject the idea o f incorporation. These are among others 
Lemon (1996; Mirror (1995 c); Pitso (1991); M irror (1994 a, b, 
and c). Those who argue for incorporation such as UNDP (1995); 
Southall (1991); Mofeli (1989) represent the protagonst viewpoint 
in this debate and point out a number o f advantages that Lesotho 
stands to gain if  it were to be incorporated into South Africa.
Firstly, there are economic gains that are likely to be enjoyed 
(Cobbe, 1991). Lesotho's economic over dependence on South 
Africa is in terms o f  employment opportunities. More than 
100,000 Basotho were employed in South A frica at any point in
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time in a year as migrant labours. Since the era o f economic 
boycotts to the former apartheid regime in South Africa, Basotho 
migrant workers have been subjected to continuous retrenchment 
estimated at about 3,000 per annum during the early 1990's 
(Matlosa, 1991). Those who argue for Lesotho's incorporation into 
present-day South Africa hope that it might be possible to stop this 
retrenchment and its negative impacts on Lesotho once 
incorporation is effected, because it would no longer be necessary 
as all would be South Africans (Weisfelder, 1992). On their part, 
the migrant Basotho workers themselves would enjoy full 
employment rights with their formerly South African co-workers 
(Cobbe, 1991). There is an assumed free market for labour 
underlying the argument advanced above. It must be noted, 
however, that loss o f revenue from the remittances will be incurred 
by Lesotho (Matlosa, 1996; Wesfeilder, 1992). Another likely 
economic gain might be in the field o f industrial development.
Lesotho might have industrial development as a result of 
industrial deconcentration in the heartland o f South Africa to the 
hinterland o f which Lesotho would be a constituent part. 
Moreover, this industrial development might create linkages 
effects that might stimulate regional development in Lesotho 
through raw materials such as wool and mohair production as a 
result o f demand from relocated industries that manufacture wool 
products. The industrial development within Lesotho would lessen 
the total dependence o f the country on imports o f all kinds of 
industrial goods from South Africa and reduce its import bill. It 
needs to be noted, however, that industrial location is a result of 
many linkages, both forward and backward, rather than policy per 
se. Despite the long years o f the policy o f decentralised industrial 
action, South Africa's industrialisation is still centralised. In fact 
even the few industries that attempted to relocate to Bantustans 
closed down and left because o f lack o f forward and backward 
linkages and the general problem o f internal colonialism in intra 
regional political economy (Setsabi, 1993). Decaying carcasses of 
these industries can still be seen strewn all over, in places like 
Botsabelo, Thaba-Nchu and Qwa-Qwa in the Free State province,
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for example. One wonders if  Lesotho might not experience a 
similar fate in this regard because it lacks an optimal mixture o f 
forward and backward linkages and would be politically, and 
economically weaker than other regions.
Lesotho depends much on revenue generated from the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU). If Lesotho were to be 
incorporated into South Africa, this revenue would be lost because 
SACU would seize operations with regard to it (Cobbe 1991).
Protagonists argue that Lesotho's natural resources are likely to 
be developed. O f special importance in this regard is resuscitation 
o f the long closed Letseng-la-Terai diamond mine which was run 
by the De Beers mining company. The Letseng - Terai mine is 
now opened by a Lesotho company. Possibilities o f opening up 
diamond mining operations in other places like Kao, for, instance, 
exist. The present multi million dollar Lesotho Highlands W ater 
Project is another natural resource development project o f major 
economic importance between Lesotho and South Africa, during 
the construction phases o f all the phases o f the projects scheduled 
to end in the year 2025 (Moeti, 1999), Lesotho enjoys the 
Highlands Water Development Fund - an annual sum o f more than 
M60 million which it uses to finance community-based 
development projects in the country. When the actual transfer and 
sales o f water to South Africa start this fund will stop (Moeti,
1999). Moreover, around M20 million is received monthly by 
Lesotho as payment o f the water by South Africa. If  however, 
Lesotho were to become incorporated into South Africa, this 
revenue might be lost because it might not become necessary any 
more for South Africa to pay for the transferred water.
The commercial sector has, for a long time, been in the hands 
o f South African based firms. A newly striking feature is that the 
banking service is also fast reverting back to domination by South 
African banks. Recently Standard bank was replaced in January, 
1997 by Nedbank. Since 1999, the Lesotho National Developm ent 
Bank was taken over by the Standard Bank o f South A frica and 
now operates under the name o f Lesotho Bank 1999 (M ashinini 
and De Villiers, 2001).
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In any case, on their own accord, many middle and high class 
Basotho already do heavy investment banking in South Africa 
instead o f Lesotho because interest rates are higher there. 
However, this promotes capital flight out o f Lesotho and butresses 
its financial and commercial dependency (M ashinini and De 
Villiers, 2001). Protagonists hope that if Lesotho and South Africa 
incorporate Lesotho might get a better share from the commercial 
sector and the present phenomenon o f capital flight through 
banking would be abated. Protagonists content that all these likely 
economically negative sides o f the proposed incorporation would 
be over-compensated for by participation in the sharing o f the 
larger South African economic cake to which Lesotho would be 
entitled (W esfeilder, 1992).
There are also socio-politically motivated arguments raised by 
protagonsits to support the idea o f Lesotho's incorporation into 
South Africa. On the political front, an argument is made 
premised on the long standing claim by Lesotho to the land 
lost/conquered and that ceded to the Boers both o f which make up 
part o f today's Free State Province o f South Africa, back to 
Basotho now that apartheid has collapsed (Lelimo, 1998; Mokuku,
2000). Both W eisfelder (1992) and Mahao (1995) argue 
convincingly that such a claim would not be possible under the 
present Organization o f African Unity (OAU) charter on 
international boundaries which is based on the principle o f what 
W eisfelder (1992: 647) refers to as "uti possidentis" translated to 
"as you now possess" to which both Lesotho and South Africa are 
signitaries. Argument is made that, incorporation o f Lesotho into 
South Africa would be an easier and more workable option for 
Lesotho to have access to this land more especially under the BCP 
and LCD rule, since the BCP has historically been the party with 
the slogan "Ea khutla N aha" translated as "the territory shall 
return" (Mahao, 1995). The Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) 
and the Communist Party o f Lesotho (CPL) comment on this issue 
o f claiming the conquered territory in these words:
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The pipe dream that Lesotho alone among all the nations o f  
the world can successfully reclaim the territory it lost is not 
new: it is the same cheap stunt which the Basutoland  
Congress Party (BCP) used to garner votes in pow er the 
BCP 1993 elections (PFD & CPU 1995: I).
From the sociological perspective it is argued that incorporation o f 
Lesotho into South Africa would reunite the Basotho people in 
Lesotho and those o f  the Free State Province in South Africa with 
whom they have blood relationships but were separated by the 
colonial boundaries imposed by the British in collusion with the 
Boers (Mokuku, 2000). Other sociological elements to be gained 
are said to include, among others, access to cheaper and better 
social services like education. It is noted that many Basotho 
already send their children to schools with better facilities in South 
Africa (W entzel, 2001). The National M anpower Developm ent 
Secretariat, a Lesotho government department in charge o f 
scholarships, financially supports people to study at South African 
Technikons, Colleges and Universities for specialized and/or 
higher education not available in Lesotho at present (M ashinini 
and M ashinini 2003).
The health services sector offers yet another socially important 
service which it is thought Lesotho might stand to gain from 
(Cobbe, 1991). At present many Basotho already seek better and 
specialised medical treatment in South Africa (W entzel, 2001) 
along the border towns, in Bloemfontein and Betlhehem in the 
Free State Province, and Matatiele in the Eastern Cape province. 
The government owned and run Queen Elizabeth II Hospital in 
Maseru has long standing referral arrangements with Pelonomi 
Hospital in Bloemfontein (Mashinini and De Villiers, 2001).
Protagonists argue that Basotho have in the past, and will in 
future, continue to build the South African economy, yet they, 
unlike their co-workers in South Africa, are not entitled to old age 
pension schemes by the government o f South Africa. If, however, 
Lesotho were to be incorporated into South Africa, the aged and 
infirm would be legible for social welfare subsidies at par with
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their contemporaries in South Africa (Cobbe, 1991). However, the 
question o f social welfare emoluments, has to be thought out 
clearly within the context o f the present and likely future third 
world economic environment dominated by World Bank and 
International M onetary Fund (IMF) financial lending based on 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPS) which are contemptuous of 
social welfare and prefer full privatisation o f services.
Perhaps the single most important argument raised by 
protagonists relates to the possibility that Basotho o f Lesotho 
would acquire citizenship as South Africans if  Lesotho were to be 
incorporated (Cobbw, 1991; Southall, 1991). As citizens o f South 
Africa, protagonists argue, Basotho would have free movement 
because the present borders between the two countries would be 
abolished. Basotho would no longer be retrenched at work, they 
would compete at par in the labour market; they would get similar 
pension and old age schemes; they would even have the 
prerogative to decide to migrate from Lesotho and settle anywhere 
in South Africa with their families if  they so wished. The list is 
not exhaustive o f  promises to be gained. Basotho's appetites for 
the lucrativeness o f acquisition o f South Africa citizenship by 
Basotho was whetted in April, 1995 by the unilateral decision 
reached jointly by the South African Government and its trade 
union, the National Union o f M ineworkers (NUM), to grant the 
status o f permanent residence to all Basotho who have been 
working in South Africa, especially in mining, five years and 
backwards o f 1995 (Mokuku, 2000, Weisfelder, 1997). Some of 
these promises o f  possible gains need to be thought out clearly in 
their proper perspectives. For example, the phenomenon of 
retrenchment occurred in Lesotho itself when SAPS were first 
adopted in the late eighties (Matlosa, 1990). Moreover, it is one 
thing to carry an identification document that declares one either a 
Permanent Resident or even citizen o f South Africa; and quite 
another to get that document to enable one to acquire residential 
land in South Africa. It needs to be noted that the majority o f land 
in South Africa is privately owned and mechanisms to acquire it 
for (re-) settlement purpose are very difficult. Since independence,
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the ANC government has been desperately trying to get access to 
land to effect settlement o f black people as promised in the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) without much 
success (Ntsebenza and Hendriks, 2000). How then can one hope 
that an added burden o f people from Lesotho might make the 
situation any better? The likely scenario is that people below the 
middle class in Lesotho - a majority at present -might move from a 
rural or urban village in Lesotho directly to a squatter camp in a 
town o f their preference in South Africa, where the waiting list for 
decent housing is already long beyond tolerance levels as shown 
by the increasing wave o f "illegal" land occupations by some 
communities. The upper and middle class cadre in Lesotho are 
themselves already purchasing houses and even farms anywhere 
they like in South Africa without incorportation because they can 
afford the going prices and tenure condition (Murray, 2000). Some 
Basotho even have illegal double/dual citizenship in Lesotho and 
South Africa (Mokuku, 2000).
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to highlight the fact that South Africa and 
Lesotho have co-existed throughout their histories to date. This 
co-existence has however, been highly unequal, with South Africa 
not only calling the shots, as it were, but on many occasions 
imposing and dictating terms to Lesotho. On its part, Lesotho has 
always had little choice but to become conformist to South Africa's 
wishes because o f its economic over-dependence on South Africa 
and fear o f the military might o f the latter (M atlosa, 1997; 
Machobane, 2001:69-71).
However, the collapse o f apartheid and attainm ent o f 
democratisation in Southa Africa has sparked o ff both a feeling and 
desire in some circles within Lesotho that perhaps forging an 
incorporation into South Africa might be the best option to 
safeguard and spearhead Lesotho's present and future development 
towards a more fruitful and secure direction. The United Nations
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Development Programme (UNDP) (1995: iv) hones this point in 
these works:
Sooner rather than later, it is vital that Lesotho acts 
quickly in order to avoid becoming marginalised.
Unless Lesotho acts, at the very least, negotiates 
favourable access to the South African labour 
market, the mountain kingdom will end up suffering  
the same kind o f  economic stagnation as the 
hom eland areas suffered under the old apartheid  
regime.
This paper highlights the fact that at present, there is no unanimity 
on the question o f incorporation within Lesotho. While much 
debate is lively among urban-based intellectuals and politicians 
about this possibility, the ordinary urban and rural Basotho have 
not yet been formally consulted to pronounce themselves on this 
issue. Neither has there been a clearly articulated statement o f the 
position o f South Africa on it. According to the ANC (1992), 
however, Lesotho was not shaded as one o f the ten proposed 
regions for democratic South Africa.
This paper notes with concern, the fact that incorporation of 
Lesotho into South Africa would imply direct loss o f unitary state 
sovereignty, nation-statehood and nationalism by Lesotho and all 
the accompanying rights both international and national that go 
with the rights o f sovereignty. The paper notes with equal concern, 
the ever overwhelming economic, social, political and military 
dependence o f Lesotho on South Africa. The paper concludes that, 
in order to promote an inclusive and conclusive debate, the 
question o f Lesotho’s integration/incorporation with South Africa 
should be subjected to a national referendum.
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